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The safety net is a broad array of federal and state programs that supports families through cash, food,
housing assistance, and tax credits. Some are universal insurance programs that provide benefits regard-
less of other income and assets while others, often called means-tested programs, provide benefits to
those with low incomes. Some federal programs operate the same across the country, and others allow
for significant state administrative variation. The federal and state governments jointly fund other parts
of the safety net, and eligibility and benefits vary across the states. States may also fund programs to fill
in the gaps or augment federal programs. These variations mean that low-income families can face very
different safety nets across the country.
This paper examines how safety net policy variation affects poverty among adults under age 65 and chil-
dren. We measure the effects using a Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) that captures the effects of
cash, noncash, and tax elements of the safety net and show the net effects on adult and child poverty.
In 2009, the Office of Management and Budget formed an Interagency Technical Working Group
(ITWG) on developing the SPM to provide an “improved understanding of the economic well-being
of American families and of how Federal policies affect those living in poverty.”1 The SPM would not
replace the official poverty measure, which is based only on cash income, but would supplement it. The
SPM provides a useful benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of safety net policies.
We highlight the safety nets in three focal states: Georgia, Illinois, and Massachusetts. These states were
chosen to illustrate the effects of narrow, medium, and broad safety nets. The results show how univer-
sal and means-tested programs affect poverty and how federal and state program rules have very differ-
ent effects across states with different populations and economies.
HOW DO STATES’ SAFETY NET 
POLICIES AFFECT POVERTY?
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The paper begins with a summary of the safety net programs included in the assessment. The next sec-
tion summarizes methods, including the data, the choice of focal states, the SPM metric, and the methods
used to implement the SPM in the focal states. Then we describe the variation in demographic and eco-
nomic characteristics and safety net policies across these states. The results show how the safety net policies
affect both the official and SPM measures of poverty in the three states. Results also highlight how indi-
vidual elements of the safety net affect poverty and net incomes throughout the income distribution.
Federal and state safety net programs substantially reduce poverty, especially among children. The focal
states’ safety net policies have substantially different effects on poverty, but federal policies tend to
smooth out differences across the three focal states.
The Safety Net
There is no single definition of the safety net. We focus our analysis on the largest programs that pro-
vide cash or near-cash support to nonelderly families that experience unemployment, disability, death,
or low income (table 1).2 Programs are categorized as universal cash, means-tested cash, and means-tested
noncash programs.
Universal cash benefit programs include Social Security and unemployment insurance (UI). Both pay
benefits to insured workers and sometimes their dependents in the event of a loss of earnings. They are
universal because individuals can receive benefits regardless of their other income or resources. Both pro-
grams rely on payroll taxes for financing. Social Security benefits do not vary across the country, but
states set UI eligibility and benefit rules.
Social Security benefits for nonelderly families are contingent on a loss of earnings due to severe dis-
ability or death. For young workers, eligibility generally requires earnings in covered employment in 5
of the last 10 years. Benefits are defined by a progressive formula that replaces a larger share of earnings
for lower-earning than higher-earning workers. The dependents of insured workers (spouse and children
under age 18) qualify for benefits set at approximately half the worker’s benefit. While most think of
Social Security as a retirement program, disability, survivor, and dependent benefits substantially reduce
poverty among children (Gabe 2008).
Insured workers who lose a job involuntarily may qualify for unemployment insurance. State programs
vary in whether they cover unemployment among part-time covered workers, how they define the base
period for wage determination, and whether they allow for benefits for workers that quit for good rea-
son. The regular UI program usually provides benefits for 26 weeks. Two additional tiers of benefits can
extend coverage. The federal-state extended benefits program (EB) can pay an additional 13 to 20 weeks
of regular UI, and the federal temporary extended unemployment compensation (EUC) program
enacted in June 2008 can provide as many as 53 additional weeks of benefits.3 Benefit levels generally
depend on past wages up to a maximum; 13 states provided some benefits for dependents in 2008.4 As
a result of the strict eligibility rules, many unemployed workers do not qualify for benefits. For exam-
ple, from 1998 to 2007, the share of unemployed workers that qualified for benefits ranged from less
than 20 percent in five states (Colorado, Florida, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia) to above 45 per-
cent in others (Alaska, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode Island; see Vroman 2009).
Means-tested cash benefit programs include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), General
Assistance (GA), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). TANF provides cash benefits to low-income,
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Administrative & funding 
Program Characteristics responsibility Key state variation
Universal cash
Social Security
Unemployment 
insurance 
(regular)
Means-tested cash
TANF
General 
Assistance
SSI
Means-tested noncash
Supplemental 
Nutrition 
Assistance 
(SNAP)
Housing 
Assistance
Child care
Refundable tax credits
Federal tax 
credits
State tax credits
TABLE 1. Key Safety Net Programs in 2008
Source: Compiled from various state plans.
Entitlement = benefits available to all eligible; limited = benefits available until money runs out; FPL = federal poverty level
Cash benefit due insured
individual & dependents for
retirement, death, disability.
Cash benefit due individual if
involuntarily unemployed &
insured.
Cash benefits to families with
children, very low income
and assets. Limited.
Cash or voucher to very poor
not eligible for other
programs; often for
unemployable. Limited.
Cash to low-income elderly
and seriously disabled
children and adults.
Entitlement.
EBT card to pay for food for
households with income 
< 130% FPL. Entitlement.
Rent vouchers or public
housing unit for low-income
households; limits rent to
30% of income. Limited.
Reduces cost of child care for
low-income families.
EITC for low earners, child tax
credit phases out at
$110,000 AGI for a joint
return and $75,000 for
single filers. Entitlement.
EITC & low-income credits.
Entitlement.
All federal; wage tax covers
cost.
States set rules; wage tax
covers regular benefits;
federal revenues if high
unemployment.
State sets rules within
federal constraints.
All states, 33 statewide
programs in 2006.
Federal benefit and asset
limits; state administered.
Federal benefit and
eligibility requirements;
states administer; state
options.
Federal, administered by
state housing authorities.
State rules with federal and
state funding.
Federal.
States.
None.
Minimum and maximum benefit
levels; base period definition for
eligibility and benefit; part-time
eligibility; dependent coverage.
Benefit levels; time limits;
diversion strategies.
Benefit levels; whether cash or
voucher; eligibility groups.
Benefit supplements.
Certification period; asset limits;
access variability; countable
income and deductions.
Vouchers and public housing units
allocated across states using a
complex formula with
numerous historic components.
Eligibility for subsidy, copays,
maximums.
None.
EITC often piggybacks on federal
EITC; other low-income credits.
low-asset families with children under age 18, and parents generally are subject to work requirements.
The federal government funds about 60 percent of the cost of this program through a fixed block grant
set in 1996, and states fund the remainder through maintenance of effort requirements. While the fed-
eral government gives states broad leeway to define their programs, it requires state programs to meet
minimum work participation requirements and prohibits use of federal dollars for payments beyond five
years. State benefit levels, time limits, and strategies that divert families from enrolling in the program
vary tremendously.
Statewide GA programs operate in about 33 states and generally provide either cash benefits or vouch-
ers for unemployable adults and sometimes families with children that do not qualify for TANF. States
are fully responsible for GA program funds and benefit rules.
SSI, in contrast, operates across all states with federal eligibility and benefit rules. SSI provides benefits
to severely disabled adults and children and requires strict income and asset limits for eligibility. States
may supplement the federal benefit.
Means-tested noncash benefit programs include Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP), housing assis-
tance, and child care subsidies. SNAP is a federal program providing an electronic benefits transfer (EBT)
card to low-income households to purchase food. While benefit levels are the same across the country
and vary primarily by household size and income level, states can adopt many options that affect eligi-
bility, deductions from income, access, and allowable asset levels. In 2008, estimated participation rates
(the share of eligible households that enrolled) ranged from about 50 percent (in California, Colorado,
Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming) to 80 percent or more (in D.C., Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia; see Cunnyngham and Castner 2010).
The federal government subsidizes renters through Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers and public hous-
ing. These programs generally limit the rent of low-income families (most have incomes at or below 30 per-
cent of area median income) to a maximum of 30 percent of their income (adjusted for necessary expenses).
These are not entitlement programs. Families that apply for assistance typically wait several months to many
years for assistance.5 The distribution of vouchers and public housing across states and local areas results
from various allocation methods used over the years, and Congress has often modified the exact distribu-
tion formula in the appropriations process (U.S. Ways and Means Committee 2009).
Child care subsidies complete this set of noncash benefits. Low-income working families may receive a
voucher to pay for child care (or the provider is paid directly). States operate the largest program, the
Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), which receives a large part of its funding directly through
the federal government, plus a share of the TANF block grant and state contributions. Eligibility and
subsidy levels are defined by the states, and most cannot provide subsidies for all families that qualify.
Another important element of the safety net is refundable tax credits. The federal earned income tax
credit (EITC) provides a substantial refundable credit for earners with children (up to $4,824 for earn-
ers with two or more children in 2008) and a much smaller benefit for earners without children (a max-
imum of $438 in 2008). In 2008, 24 states (including the District of Columbia) augmented this credit
by adding a state EITC, usually a percentage of the federal credit; the credits are also refundable in
21 states (Levitis and Koulish 2008). States may also provide other types of low-income tax credits. The
federal child tax credit enables lower- and middle-income families to subtract $1,000 from their taxes
for each qualifying child under the age of 17. If the amount of the child tax credit exceeds what the fam-
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ily owes in taxes, then the family may be eligible to receive some or all of the excess amount through the
refundable portion of the child tax credit (also known as the additional child tax credit).6
The safety net provides critical help to many low-income families. Differences by state vary consider-
ably across safety net programs. Social Security and federal tax credits provide an entitlement to bene-
fits with no variation across the country. SSI is also a federal entitlement with standard benefits paid
across the country, but some states supplement this benefit. The states play the major role in defining
who gets UI, TANF, GA, state tax credits, and child care subsidies and how much they get. Housing
assistance is a unique federal program with benefits that vary with rental costs across the country, and
the number of assisted units available depends on numerous factors, including historic trends.
Assessing States’ Safety Nets
An assessment of how these various safety net programs augment the net incomes of low-income fami-
lies requires examining the rules by state and assessing the variation in family needs across states. All else
equal, states with more generous safety net policies provide more assistance per low-income family.
The Focal States
Given wide variety in policies and family needs across all 50 states, we focus on three states to illustrate
different safety net policies. We purposefully chose states representing relatively low, moderate, and gen-
erous safety net policies. We reviewed states’ maximum benefits for TANF, UI, and refundable tax cred-
its to assess generosity. We limited the choice to states of fair size and those that did not vary their safety
net policies substantially across the state. We also tried to limit the variation in pre–safety net income
across the focal states by choosing states with similar unemployment rates in 2008 and similar child
poverty rates once safety net benefits were removed and incomes adjusted for variation in cost of living.
These factors led us to choose Georgia to illustrate a state with a relatively limited safety net policy, Illi-
nois with a moderate policy, and Massachusetts with a generous policy.
The Poverty Measure
This assessment requires a metric that incorporates all the key safety net programs described above. The
official poverty rate is based only on cash income and only includes variation in Social Security, UI, TANF,
GA, and SSI. In contrast, the SPM includes cash and noncash benefits, and the effect of taxes and other
necessary expenses on poverty (table 2). The SPM includes the effects of SNAP, housing subsidies, fed-
eral and state income taxes, and necessary work expenses (child care, transportation, and other work-
related expenses).7 As noted above, federal agencies are still working out specific details of the SPM. We
implement the 2010 research version of the SPM as closely as possible for this analysis (see Short 2011).
The thresholds defining poverty also vary between the two poverty definitions. The official poverty thresh-
old is constant across the country, varies by family size and number of children, and assumes that the elderly
require less income than the nonelderly. The SPM also varies by family size and number of children, but it
does not assume lower thresholds for the elderly and includes adjustments for whether a family rents or owns
a home with or without a mortgage and for geographic differences in housing costs. The official poverty
thresholds, first set in 1963, were originally based on the cost of the USDA’s “Economy Food Plan” devel-
oped from a 1955 household expenditure survey and multiplied by three, the estimated share of income
spent on food. The official poverty thresholds are adjusted annually for price changes using the consumer
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Concepts Census official Supplemental (SPM)
Resources
Thresholds
TABLE 2. Resource Definitions for Official and Supplemental Poverty Measures
a. LIHEAP, WIC, School Lunch, and child support payments are excluded because they are not reported on the survey nor simulated.
b. See Garner (2010, 2011a) and Short (2011) for a description of the SPM thresholds. The standard SPM deducts medical out-of-pocket (MOOP)
costs from income as a necessary expense. Lacking an estimate of this expense, we use alternative BLS thresholds that include these costs (Garner 2011b).
Cash Income:
Wages, salaries, self-employment
Interest, dividends, rent, trusts
Social Security & Railroad Retire.
Pensions
Disability benefits
Unemployment compensation
Child support
Veterans benefits
Educational assistance
Supplemental Security Income
TANF
Other cash public assistance
National thresholds vary by age (less than 65
and 65+) and number of children and
adults. The original thresholds were based
on the share of income spent on food under
an “Economy Food Plan” developed from a
1955 expenditure survey. The thresholds are
adjusted annually for price changes using
the CPI.
Cash Income:
Same as components shown for “official” measure.
+ Food Stamps/SNAP
+ housing subsidies
+ LIHEAP (omitted)a
+ WIC (omitted)a
+ school lunch (omitted)a
− federal income tax
− payroll taxes
− state income taxes
+ federal EITC
+ state EITC
− child support payments (omitted)a
− child care expenses
− other work expenses
Thresholds vary by number of children and adults and
housing status (owns with mortgage, owns without
mortgage, or rents) and reflect the 33rd percentile of
expenditures by families with two children on a
basic set of goods (food, housing, utilities, clothing,
out-of-pocket medical costs) plus a little more based
on five years of Consumer Expenditures Survey
data.b Geographic adjustments are applied to the
housing portion of the threshold, and the medical
portion is adjusted by insurance, health, and
elderly/nonelderly status.
price index but have otherwise changed little since their original adoption more than 40 years ago. The SPM
threshold is based on out-of-pocket spending for food, clothing, shelter, and utilities, with a multiplier of
1.2 to provide for additional basic needs. The threshold is calculated using five years of recent Consumer
Expenditure Survey data and reflects spending at the 33rd percentile for families with two children. The ver-
sion of the SPM thresholds used for this analysis also includes out-of-pocket health care spending, adjusted
by family health insurance, health, and elderly/nonelderly status. In addition, we adjust the housing portion
of the SPM threshold for geographic variation in housing costs by Super-PUMA (Census Bureau–defined
state subsections comprising populations of 400,000 or more).
The differences in the resources underlying the measures and the threshold calculations produce sub-
stantially different thresholds across the states (table 3). (Appendix A provides more detail on the thresh-
olds used in the three states.) In 2008, the official poverty threshold was $21,834 for a two-adult,
two-child family. The SPM threshold before adjusting for differences in renter/owner status, medical
out-of-pocket expenses, and geographic variation in housing costs was $25,997.8 After applying these
adjustments to each family’s threshold, the resulting average threshold for a two-adult, two-child fam-
ily in Georgia was $24,778. The average threshold in Illinois was $25,959 (about 5 percent higher than
Georgia), and the threshold in Massachusetts was $29,694 (about 20 percent higher than Georgia). As
shown, the thresholds for homeowners with no mortgage are significantly lower than average, and the
thresholds for those who own with a mortgage are higher.
Implementing the SPM
The analysis requires a representative survey with sufficient sample for individual state analysis. We use
the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) representative of 2008 income for this analysis. The sur-
vey provides large samples for each state: approximately 92,000 total persons in Georgia, 123,000 in
Illinois, and 62,000 in Massachusetts. Since we focus on safety net policies serving families under age
65 and children, we tabulate results only for these populations. In families where children live with
elderly heads, however, we include those adults so the population covers all families with children in the
three focal states.9
While the ACS includes key demographic information and asks households about their employment
and income during the year, it lacks many elements required for the SPM. Some of the missing elements
are SNAP benefit amounts, receipt and amounts of housing assistance, taxes (federal and state), and work
expenses. Some available ACS data elements are not sufficiently accurate for detailed state-level analy-
sis. For example, some income sources are combined into one variable (UI, veterans benefits, child sup-
port) and others fall considerably short of administrative program totals (SNAP receipt, SSI, welfare).
Therefore, the analysis requires a considerable number of data imputations and corrections. Generally,
we use simulation procedures implemented through the TRIM3 model to implement each element of
income, taxes, and expenses at the household level. The simulation processes mimic the individual pro-
gram rules in each focal state during 2008. The results of each imputation are compared with adminis-
trative data to assess their accuracy, and repeated simulations align the totals to administrative data. (See
appendix B for details.)
The result of the simulation process is a set of augmented ACS data representative of families living in the
three focal states. Results are tabulated using both the official and the SPM poverty measures. We frequently
HOW DO STATES’ SAFETY NET POLICIES AFFECT POVERTY? 7
Housing Status
Own with Own without 
Overall Rent mortgage mortgage
Official threshold $21,834 — — —
SPM threshold $25,997 $26,252 $26,660 $21,860
SPM thresholds averaged over state population,
with geographic, medical risk, and housing 
status adjustments
Georgia $24,778 $24,313 $25,402 $20,276
Illinois $25,959 $25,270 $26,512 $21,194
Massachusetts $29,694 $29,111 $30,189 $24,019
TABLE 3. Poverty Thresholds for Two Adults, Two Children: Variation across States, 2008
Notes: SPM thresholds are obtained from Garner (2011b). See appendix A for discussion of adjustments by family size, health status, and housing cost
variation across state metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.
show family “pre–safety net” (or “private”) income that excludes all government safety net benefits to show
the effects of safety net programs and how families that are poor based on their pre–safety net income
move across the poverty income distribution once all government assistance and elements of the SPM are
calculated.
Variation across the Three Focal States
Differences in family characteristics and safety net policies across the three states provide the context for
understanding differences in poverty. For example, safety net policies that target children will have a
larger effect overall if the state’s low-income population tends to consist primarily of families with chil-
dren. Policies focused on low-income workers will have a larger effect if a state has relatively more work-
ing poor families. Differences across the state populations also intersect with the SPM poverty thresholds.
For example, relatively higher homeownership rates mean that, on average, families will need more
resources to move above the poverty threshold.
Characteristics
The nonelderly populations vary in some important ways across the three focal states (table 4). Massa-
chusetts has the smallest population (2.17 million nonelderly families) of the three; Georgia is in the
middle (3.18 million) and Illinois has the largest (4.09 million). The pre–safety net poor population,
the primary group targeted by the safety net, makes up about 19 percent of the nonelderly population
in Georgia and 17 percent in Illinois and Massachusetts. Family structure among all nonelderly families
varies somewhat; Massachusetts has relatively more families without children than the other two states
(64 percent compared with about 60 percent). This difference carries over to the pre–safety net poor
population. Average family size is smaller in Massachusetts, especially among the lower-income group.
The age distributions across the states are quite similar for all families and lower-income families.
Younger family heads (under age 34) make up much larger shares of the pre–safety net poor populations
in all three states than in the general population.
The race/ethnicity distributions vary across the three states. Overall, Massachusetts has the highest per-
centage of white families (79 percent), Georgia has the highest percentage of black families (30 percent),
and Illinois has the highest percentage of Hispanic families (13 percent). Blacks and Hispanics make up
greater shares of the pre–safety net poor population than of the general population in all three states,
although whites continue to make up most of the lower-income group in Massachusetts.
Housing tenure varies relatively little across the three states, although Massachusetts families are more
likely to rent and less likely to own a home without a mortgage than families in Georgia or Illinois. In all
three states, the lower-income families are predominantly renters. Within-state geographic distributions
also vary; Georgia has a more rural population and Massachusetts a more urban one. Similar to all fami-
lies, pre–safety net poor families in Massachusetts are much more likely to live in urban areas (94 per-
cent compared with 65 percent in Georgia and 82 percent in Illinois), and pre–safety net poor families
in Georgia are more likely to live in rural areas (28 percent compared with 14 percent in Illinois and
1 percent in Massachusetts).
While work status is similar across the three states for the general nonelderly population, some differences
exist for pre–safety net poor families. For example, pre–safety net poor families in Massachusetts are less likely
to include at least one full-time worker (14 percent compared with 21 percent in Georgia and Illinois).
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All Pre–Safety Net Poora
GA IL MA GA IL MA
Number of Families (thousands) 3,180 4,089 2,170 603 689 370
Average Unit Size 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.0
Average Pre–Safety Net Incomeb 65,883 75,089 85,330 7,548 7,979 7,666
Family structure
Two parents with children (includes 25.8 28.0 25.8 12.6 14.6 10.6
cohabitors)c
One parent with children 10.5 9.0 8.3 21.9 20.9 20.6
Other families with children 4.2 3.1 2.3 6.6 5.1 2.8
Other 59.5 59.9 63.5 59.0 59.4 66.0
Age of Family Head
< 34 29.6 29.1 27.5 41.9 43.2 40.7
34–49 41.8 40.5 41.0 31.0 29.2 30.8
50+ 28.6 30.5 31.5 27.1 27.7 28.6
Race
White, non-Hispanic 58.6 67.2 79.4 42.2 48.4 62.2
Black, non-Hispanic 29.8 14.1 5.5 40.6 27.0 9.5
Hispanic 7.5 12.9 8.4 12.6 18.1 19.1
Other 4.1 5.8 6.7 4.5 6.4 9.2
Housing Tenure
Rent 38.1 35.3 40.4 68.6 69.1 77.1
Own without mortgage 11.0 11.4 8.9 10.3 8.7 5.7
Own with mortgage 50.9 53.3 50.6 21.2 22.2 17.2
Geography
Urban 70.4 83.4 91.3 65.3 82.4 93.7
Rural 23.2 12.1 1.9 28.3 13.6 1.4
Not identified 6.3 4.5 6.8 6.3 4.0 4.9
Work Status
At least one adult full timed 74.0 74.3 72.0 21.3 20.6 13.6
Some work (among adults) 17.2 17.7 19.6 41.0 43.0 45.8
No work (among adults) 8.8 8.0 8.5 37.7 36.5 40.6
TABLE 4. Family Characteristics by State, 2008 (SPM Units Containing Children or Nonelderly Heads)
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
a. Units with pre–safety net income lower than the SPM poverty threshold.
b. Pre–safety net income includes cash income before cash and noncash government benefits, and tax credits. Workers compensation and veterans
benefits are included in pre–safety net income because these benefits are reported as other income on the ACS.
c. The cohabiting partner is not necessarily the biological or adoptive parent of any children in the unit.
d. At least one person in the unit is age 18 or older, works 50 or more weeks in the year, and usually works 35 hours or more a week.
State Safety Nets
We chose three focal states that illustrate narrow, moderate, and broad safety net policies (table 5). UI
and TANF benefits are highest in Massachusetts and lowest in Georgia. Georgia does not have a
statewide GA program, but Illinois and Massachusetts have programs for both unemployable adults and
families with children that do not qualify for TANF. Illinois and Massachusetts pay supplements to fed-
eral SSI benefits, but the amounts are higher in Massachusetts than in Illinois.
Means-tested noncash benefits also differ. SNAP rules vary relatively little across these three states,
although certification periods (how long a family can keep benefits before reapplying) are longer in Illi-
nois than in the other states (12 months rather than 6 months), and Georgia and Massachusetts offer
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Program Program element Georgia Illinois Massachusetts
Universal Cash
Social Security
Unemployment 
insurance (regular 
program)
Means-Tested Cash
TANF
General Assistance
SSI
Means-Tested Noncash
Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance (SNAP)
Housing Assistance
Child care subsidies 
(CCDF)
Federal tax credits
State tax credits
TABLE 5. Safety Net Policy Variation across Focal States, 2008
No variation.
Max benefit/week;
max weeks.
Max benefit if 
0 income;
time limit.
Monthly benefit;
eligibility.
Monthly supplement.
Asset limits.
Number; fair-market
rent (FMR), 2-bed
urban.
Reduces cost of child
care for low-income
families.
None.
EITC & low-income
credits. Entitlement.
$320; 26 weeks.
$280; 48 mos.
No program.
None.
Certify for 6 mos.;
expanded 
categorical 
eligibility.
.014 vouchers/
capita; $764 FMR.
Eligibility limit for 
family of 3:
$2,213.
—
$26/dependent if 
AGI < $20,000 
and no SNAP.
$385–634;
26 weeks.
$432; 60 mos.
$154–65 (single
unemployable
adults);
$389–414 
(4-person 
families).
Average $79/
person (varies).
Certify for 12 mos.
.017 vouchers/
capita; $876
FMR.
Eligibility limit 
for family of 3:
$2,647.
—
5% of federal 
EITC.
$628–$942;
30 weeks.
$633; no limit.
$304 (1-person 
family) +$93 a
mo. per person.
Unemployable
adults + families
not eligible for
TANF.
$120 (person);
$195 (couple).
Certify for 6 mos.;
expanded 
categorical 
eligibility.
.029 vouchers/
capita;
$1,181 FMR.
Eligibility limit for
family of 3:
$2,990.
—
15% of federal EITC.
Source: Compiled from various state plans.
expanded categorical eligibility. Fewer housing assistance vouchers are available per capita in Georgia
(0.014) than in Illinois (0.017) or Massachusetts (0.029). The monthly average fair-market rent values
for two-bedroom urban units vary from $764 in Georgia to $876 in Illinois and $1,181 in Massachu-
setts, so voucher values also vary across these states.
The federal EITC and refundable child tax credits are the same across the country. However, the maximum
amount of these credits represents a higher share of the poverty threshold in lower-threshold states such as
Georgia, increasing their antipoverty potential. In addition, poor families in higher poverty threshold states
such as Massachusetts have incomes further into the phase out range of the federal EITC, where benefit
amounts are lower, thereby reducing the potential antipoverty effect. The state tax credits offset this effect
somewhat. Illinois provides an EITC of 5 percent on top of the federal credit, and Massachusetts pro-
vides a 15 percent credit. Of course, only families with earnings qualify for these refundable state credits.
Georgia in contrast, provides a small tax credit ($26 per dependent) to all low-income families.
Child care subsidies are also important because they can substantially reduce these necessary expenses
among working families. Massachusetts has the highest monthly income thresholds for eligibility for
CCDF-funded child care subsidies ($2,990 for a three-person family, compared with $2,647 in Illinois
and $2,213 in Georgia).
Receipt of Safety Net Benefits
The receipt of benefits for all families and for pre–safety net poor families varies across the states (table 6).
Considering cash assistance, the relatively high receipt of welfare (TANF and other) in Massachusetts stands
out. Among all families, 4.2 percent receive welfare in Massachusetts compared with 1.4 and 1.8 percent,
respectively, in Georgia and Illinois, and 18.1 percent of the pre–safety net poor group receives welfare in
Massachusetts compared with 5.0 and 6.6 percent, respectively, in Georgia and Illinois. As shown earlier,
Massachusetts provides the highest TANF benefit with no time limit, and its General Assistance benefit is
higher than in Illinois (Georgia does not have a GA benefit). Receipt of SSI is also higher in Massachusetts
than in Georgia and Illinois among the lower-income group (19.9 percent compared with 15.0 percent in
Georgia and 13.8 percent in Illinois). Massachusetts offers the highest supplement to the federal benefit.
The receipt of noncash assistance also varies across the states. SNAP receipt is more common in Geor-
gia and Illinois than in Massachusetts. As noted earlier, Illinois has a higher SNAP participation rate
than most other states. In 2008, for example, 66 percent of eligible working families participated in
SNAP in Illinois, compared with 53 percent in Georgia and 46 percent in Massachusetts (Cunnyngham
and Castner 2010). The TRIM3 simulation results used for this analysis mimic these participation pat-
terns since participants are selected to match program totals.
Receipt of public and subsidized housing reflects the greater availability of this benefit in Massachusetts
relative to the other states. Among pre–safety net poor families, 27.1 percent receive this assistance in
Massachusetts compared with 14.4 percent in Georgia and 17.9 percent in Illinois.
The receipt of the federal EITC is higher in Georgia and Illinois than in Massachusetts. Massachusetts
has relatively fewer workers among its lower-income families, and it has fewer families with children that
can qualify for the larger credit. As expected, families in Illinois and Massachusetts receive state EITCs at
the same rate as the federal EITC. A high share (94.7 percent) of Georgia’s low-income families receives
the state low-income credit.
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The average benefits received by those enrolled also reflect program rules and the states’ economic charac-
teristics. Average Social Security benefits for all families range from $11,738 in Georgia to $12,497 in Illi-
nois. Social Security benefits reflect family composition (whether they are primarily single adults or families)
and earnings histories among those qualifying. Average unemployment insurance, welfare, and SSI bene-
fits are highest in Massachusetts and lowest in Georgia, with Illinois falling in the middle. SNAP benefits
are somewhat lower in Massachusetts than in the other states ($2,247 for pre–safety net poor families com-
pared with $2,759 and $2,856, respectively, in Georgia and Illinois). In contrast, the value of the housing
assistance benefit is highest in Massachusetts, reflecting its higher fair-market rents. The average value of
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All Pre–Safety Net Poora
GA IL MA GA IL MA
Percent of SPM units with income source
Positive pre–safety net incomeb 94.9 95.6 95.2 73.2 73.8 71.8
Social Security 10.2 8.9 10.1 22.3 20.8 23.6
Unemployment compensation 6.7 9.7 10.1 8.3 10.1 10.5
Welfare (TANF, SSF, other) 1.4 1.8 4.2 5.0 6.6 18.1
SSI 4.4 3.8 4.9 15.0 13.8 19.9
Near-Cash Assistance
SNAP 15.3 15.0 12.2 61.5 66.4 55.4
Public/subsidized housing 3.2 3.5 5.2 14.4 17.9 27.1
Federal EITC 20.2 17.0 12.6 48.1 46.9 37.7
Federal refundable child tax credit 12.7 11.1 7.6 20.1 20.9 15.6
State EITC/Georgia Low Income Credit 31.3 17.0 12.6 94.7 46.9 37.7
Average income amount if receivedc
Positive pre–safety net incomeb 69,414 78,558 89,646 10,314 10,810 10,680
Cash Assistance
Social Security 11,738 12,497 12,038 11,261 12,435 11,639
Unemployment compensation 3,815 4,696 6,094 3,330 3,852 4,464
Welfare (TANF, SSF, other) 2,640 3,082 4,698 2,510 2,950 4,750
SSI 5,909 6,392 6,944 6,423 6,956 7,409
Near-Cash Assistance
SNAP 2,405 2,434 1,972 2,759 2,856 2,247
Public/subsidized housing 4,653 5,197 5,438 5,169 5,747 5,848
Federal EITC 1,876 1,869 1,668 2,081 2,135 1,882
Federal refundable child tax credit 1,247 1,246 1,185 1,088 1,144 1,201
State EITC/Georgia Low Income Credit 31 93 250 40 107 282
TABLE 6. Sources of Income, 2008 (SPM Units Containing Children or Nonelderly Heads)
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
a. Units with pre–safety net income lower than the SPM poverty threshold.
b. Pre–safety net income includes cash income before cash and noncash government benefits and tax credits. Workers compensation and veterans
benefits are included in pre–safety net income because they are reported as other income on the ACS.
c. Average positive income amount received.
the EITC is lowest in Massachusetts, probably reflecting relatively fewer full-time workers, families with
children, and smaller family sizes as discussed earlier. The value of the EITC (and other safety net benefits)
also reflects the incomes of enrollees, and enrollees with lower incomes generally receive higher benefits.
Summary
The characteristics of the three focal states’ populations differ in some important ways, although differ-
ences are not dramatic. Massachusetts has somewhat smaller family sizes, fewer full-time workers, and
more individuals in families without children. Approximately a quarter of Georgia’s families and pre-
transfer poor families live in rural areas, compared with less than 2 percent in Massachusetts. About 19
percent of nonelderly families in Georgia and 17 percent in Illinois and Massachusetts have private
(pre–safety net) incomes below the SPM poverty threshold. States’ safety net policies vary in expected
directions with Georgia providing the lowest benefits in programs determined by state policy and Mass-
achusetts providing the highest benefits. These policies, as well as families’ economic positions and the
extent of participation in safety net programs, determine the overall level of benefits in each state.
Poverty across the Focal States
The differences in states’ population characteristics and safety net policies affect their poverty profiles.
Using the official poverty definition, the poverty rate among children is 10.5 percent in Massachusetts,
nearly half the 19.3 percent rate in Georgia (table 7). Since the official poverty measure uses fixed thresholds
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Population Official SPM without SPM with 
(thousands) poverty rate geographic adjustment geographic adjustment
All (in units with children or nonelderly heads)
GA 8,558 14.1 15.2 12.9
IL 11,154 11.8 11.5 11.2
MA 5,506 8.8 6.9 9.4
Children
GA 2,540 19.3 16.7 13.8
IL 3,173 16.4 12.7 12.4
MA 1,430 10.5 5.4 9.0
Adults (in units with children or nonelderly heads)
GA 6,018 12.0 14.5 12.5
IL 7,982 10.0 11.1 10.7
MA 4,076 8.1 7.4 9.6
Adults living with children
GA 2,739 12.6 13.0 10.5
IL 3,608 11.0 9.9 9.7
MA 1,697 7.0 4.4 7.3
Adults living without children
GA 3,279 11.4 15.8 14.2
IL 4,373 9.3 12.0 11.5
MA 2,379 8.9 9.5 11.2
TABLE 7. Variation in Poverty by Definition, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
across states, the relatively higher cost of housing in Massachusetts does not affect these results. Also, the
official poverty measure only includes cash income, and cash safety net benefits tend to be highest in
Massachusetts and lowest in Georgia. The official poverty rate differences across the states are not as dra-
matic for adults, especially those living without children, although they follow the same pattern as for
children. States’ safety net policies tend to target families with children.
The SPM before geographic adjustment in the thresholds reduces child poverty rates since all the safety
net benefits are counted. The effect is most dramatic in Massachusetts where the child poverty rate drops
from 10.5 to 5.4 percent. The child poverty rate in Illinois drops from 16.4 to 12.7 percent, and Geor-
gia’s child poverty rate drops from 19.3 to 16.7 percent. The effect for adults is mixed. Poverty increases
from 12.0 to 14.5 percent in Georgia and from 10.0 to 11.1 percent in Illinois. The Massachusetts adult
poverty rate, in contrast, drops slightly from 8.1 to 7.4 percent, reflecting the state’s relatively generous
UI and SSI policies that target adults. The SPM rates reflect differences in not just safety net benefits
but also taxes and work expenses. They also reflect thresholds that include out-of-pocket medical
expenses that are higher on average for adults than children. Taxes and necessary expenses tend to increase
the SPM among adults.
The SPM with geographic adjustment changes the state poverty differentials. Compared with the SPM
without the geographic adjustment, child poverty in Georgia drops from 16.7 to 13.8 percent, decreases
slightly in Illinois from 12.7 to 12.4 percent, and increases from 5.4 to 9.0 percent in Massachusetts. Sim-
ilarly, the SPM with geographic adjustment for adults decreases in Georgia, decreases slightly in Illinois,
and increases in Massachusetts compared with the SPM without this adjustment. The relatively high cost
of housing in Massachusetts means that families need more resources to rise above the SPM thresholds.
Summary
The SPM thresholds produce substantially different poverty rates than the official poverty rate. Since the
SPM accounts for all government benefits and necessary expenses (for taxes, child care, out-of-pocket med-
ical costs, and work expenses), families with more government benefits will tend to be less poor and those
with higher expenses more poor than shown by the official poverty measure. Also, lower housing-cost states
have lower SPM thresholds than higher housing-cost states. Moving from the official poverty rates
to the SPM without its geographic adjustment reduces poverty among children (since many benefit
programs benefit them) but increases poverty among adults (since many have high necessary expenses).
Adding the SPM geographic adjustment reduces poverty rates in Georgia and causes a slight reduction in
poverty rates in Illinois but increases poverty in Massachusetts for both children and adults, reflecting high
housing costs in Massachusetts.
How Safety Net Policies Affect the SPM
The SPM poverty rates would be much higher in all three states without safety net benefits. Eliminating all
public benefits would increase adult poverty by 7 percentage points or more—to 20.6 percent in Georgia,
17.8 percent in Illinois, and 16.2 percent in Massachusetts (figure 1a).10 Child poverty would at least dou-
ble in all three states in the absence of safety net programs (figure 1b). Poverty rates would increase from
13.8 to 28.7 percent in Georgia, from 12.4 to 24.6 percent in Illinois, and from 9.0 to 21.0 percent in
Massachusetts without federal and state benefit programs. The universal benefits (Social Security and UI)
have relatively small effects on SPM poverty rates for the nonelderly population (about 3 percentage points
for adults and 2 points for children); the means-tested programs account for most of the poverty reduction.
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FIGURE 1a. Effects of Safety Net on SPM Poverty Rate: Adults, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
Note: Rates for adults are for all adults in families with children or nonelderly heads.
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FIGURE 1b. Effects of Safety Net on SPM Poverty Rate: Children under 18, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
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Individual elements of the safety net have different effects on poverty that vary for adults and children
(figure 2). Social Security has a larger effect on adult poverty reduction since many older adults do not
have children living at home and can qualify for disability and surviving spouse benefits without having
child dependents. Social Security also reduces poverty more among adults in Georgia than in Illinois or
Massachusetts (3.2 percentage points compared with 2.7 and 2.5 percentage points) since benefits are
set nationally and the poverty thresholds in Georgia, on average, are the lowest among the three states.
Unemployment insurance is more effective in reducing poverty among children than among adults,
likely reflecting the high probability of having children in families with unemployed adults. Benefits
reduce the SPM more in Massachusetts and Illinois than in Georgia, reflecting higher UI benefit pay-
ments in these states.
The effects of some individual elements of states’ means-tested programs on SPM rates show substan-
tial differences across the three focal states (figures 3a and b). Massachusetts’s relatively generous TANF
program reduces the SPM rate among adults by 0.5 points and among children by 1.9 points, but TANF
has only minimal effects on poverty in the other states.11 SNAP, in contrast, produces similar reductions
in the SPM for adults in the three states (from 1.3 to 1.6 percentage points). The effects for children are
much larger. SNAP reduces the SPM rate by 5.1 percentage points in Georgia, 4 points in Illinois, and
3.4 points in Massachusetts. SNAP provides a national benefit and, as shown earlier, more families
receive benefits and the benefits are higher in Georgia and Illinois than in Massachusetts.
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FIGURE 2. Effects of Universal Programs on SPM Poverty Rates, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
Note: Rates for adults are for all adults in families with children or nonelderly heads.
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FIGURE 3a. Effects of Selected Safety Net Programs on SPM Poverty Rates: Adults, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
Note: Rates for adults are for all adults in families with children or nonelderly heads.
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FIGURE 3b. Effects of Selected Safety Net Programs on SPM Poverty Rates: Children under 18, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
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Housing assistance reflects its unique program parameters. Massachusetts has more vouchers to distrib-
ute relative to its population size, and the vouchers are valued at their higher housing prices. Housing
assistance reduces the child SPM rate in Massachusetts by 4.4 percentage points, but only 1.7 points in
Georgia and 2.2 points in Illinois. Finally, federal tax credits (combining the effects of the EITC and
child credit) reflect the pattern seen with other federal programs that provide the same benefit to fami-
lies with the same income and number of children regardless of where they live. In short, the geographic
variations in the SPM thresholds mean that federal benefits with fixed benefit values across the country
have a greater effect on poverty reduction in states with lower housing costs than in states with higher
housing costs. Federal tax credits reduce the SPM for children more than any other safety net programs
in Georgia and Illinois. In contrast, housing assistance has about the same effect on the SPM in Massa-
chusetts as federal tax credits. (The more detailed table in appendix C shows the effects of all safety net
programs examined in this analysis on the SPM.)
Effects on the SPM Distribution
Of course, safety net policies affect families across the distribution of poverty (as measured by the SPM).
Some families move out of deep poverty and closer to the poverty threshold even though they do not move
all the way above the threshold. Since the SPM takes into account taxes paid and necessary expenses, some
families may move down in the SPM poverty distribution if their safety net benefits do not offset neces-
sary expenses. States’ safety net policies also affect these movements.
The safety net substantially reduces the share of families in deep poverty (below 50 percent of the thresh-
old) (table 8). For example, in Georgia, 34 percent of adults in deep poverty before safety net benefits
remain in deep poverty, 45 percent move to the 50–100 percent of poverty category, and 21 percent
move above the poverty threshold after all safety net benefits, taxes, and necessary expenses are taken
into account. The shifts in poverty status among adults in Illinois are similar, with 31 percent remain-
ing in deep poverty and 21 percent moving above poverty. In Massachusetts, 30 percent of adults in deep
poverty based on their pre–safety net income move above the poverty threshold.
Poverty reduction is more dramatic for children in deep poverty before safety net benefits. Only 21 per-
cent remain in deep poverty in Georgia, along with 17 percent in Illinois and 12 percent in Massachu-
setts. Pre– and post–safety net SPM poverty rates illustrate the differences in states’ safety net policies. In
Massachusetts, 41 percent of children in deep poverty based on their families’ private incomes move out
of poverty, compared with only 20 percent in Georgia and 18 percent in Illinois.
The differences across states are smaller for families with pre–safety net incomes between 50 and 100 per-
cent of the SPM. Just over half the adults and about 40 percent of the children remain in this category
after all benefits and tax policies are taken into account in all three states. About 45 percent of adults
and 60 to 62 percent of children in this pre–safety net income group move above the poverty threshold.
While the results illustrate the effectiveness of the safety programs in reducing poverty, they also illus-
trate similar effects across the three states for families closer to the SPM thresholds. The national bene-
fit policies can moderate the effects of more minimal state safety net policies if housing costs (and
therefore SPM thresholds) are also lower.
These results also illustrate that tax policies and necessary expenses can strain the incomes of low-income
families with pre–safety net incomes above the SPM. For example, 16 to 18 percent of adults with pri-
vate incomes between 100 and 150 percent of the SPM end up with income below the SPM threshold
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in these three states. This effect is smaller for children, because more of these families qualify for the fed-
eral EITC or child tax credit, credits designed to offset taxes at these low income levels. About four-fifths
of children living in families with incomes between 100 and 150 percent of the SPM threshold remain
there after taking into account all safety net benefits, taxes, and necessary expenses.
Dissecting the SPM
The calculations behind the SPM poverty rate measurement are illustrated in table 9 for families with
children (tables in appendix C show the calculations for all families with children or nonelderly
heads). The majority of families with children that start out with private income less than the SPM
threshold remain poor in Georgia and Illinois (61 percent). However, the Massachusetts safety net
policies move a much larger share of these families above the SPM threshold (51 percent) even though
those removed from poverty begin with lower private incomes, on average, than the families lifted above
the SPM thresholds in the other two states.
The calculations for families that remain poor after all safety net benefits are taken into account show
that these families started out with less private income than those that move above poverty in all three
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Adultsa Children
50 < 100 < 150 < 50 < 100 < 150 < 
Post: < 50% 100% 150% 200% 200% 1 < 50% 100% 150% 200% 200% 1
Georgia
Pre:
< 50% 34.1 44.8 16.7 3.3 1.1 20.7 59.0 19.4 0.6 0.3
50 < 100% 3.3 51.6 37.0 5.6 2.4 0.0 39.4 57.0 3.1 0.5
100 < 150% 0.0 17.4 67.4 11.4 3.8 0.0 6.8 83.3 8.9 1.0
150 < 200% 0.0 0.0 50.2 43.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 41.6 56.1 2.3
200% + 0.0 0.0 0.2 13.6 86.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 17.4 82.3
Illinois
Pre:
< 50% 31.0 48.1 16.9 3.1 0.9 17.0 65.1 17.3 0.6 0.0
50 < 100% 3.0 50.7 37.7 6.6 2.1 0.1 39.7 57.0 3.0 0.3
100 < 150% 0.0 16.1 68.1 11.2 4.6 0.0 7.3 82.5 9.4 0.8
150 < 200% 0.0 0.1 46.1 44.3 9.6 0.0 0.3 40.6 54.0 5.1
200% + 0.0 0.0 0.1 10.8 89.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 13.6 86.1
Massachusetts
Pre:
< 50% 33.6 36.1 28.1 1.9 0.4 12.1 47.3 39.9 0.7 0.0
50 < 100% 3.9 51.1 35.6 7.5 2.0 0.1 38.0 57.6 3.8 0.5
100 < 150% 0.0 17.6 64.3 14.0 4.0 0.0 8.5 78.2 12.2 1.1
150 < 200% 0.0 0.0 50.5 39.4 10.1 0.0 0.0 44.6 51.6 3.8
200% + 0.0 0.0 0.1 10.8 89.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 13.9 85.9
TABLE 8. SPM Poverty Pre– and Post–Safety Net, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
a. Adults in units with children or nonelderly heads.
states. Families’ success in moving out of poverty to a large extent reflects their starting positions.
Nonetheless, safety net policies also figure very importantly in individual families’ economic positions.
In Georgia, families with children lifted above the SPM threshold start out with average private income
of $15,803 and end up with $27,251 in average net income (72 percent higher) (table 9).12 The increase
for those moving above the SPM threshold is 71 percent in Illinois and 115 percent in Massachusetts.
With SNAP as one important exception, the safety net benefits received by those lifted above poverty
are higher, on average, than benefits received by those remaining poor despite their relatively higher start-
ing income position. (The averages reflect both the shares receiving the benefits and the benefits
received.) Social Security benefits and unemployment benefits are higher. Again, welfare and public
housing benefits stand out in Massachusetts as substantially higher, especially among those moving above
the SPM threshold. The higher SNAP benefits for families remaining below the SPM threshold are likely
attributable to the lower private income and cash transfers received by these families, which make them
eligible for higher SNAP benefit amounts. Families remaining below the SPM threshold may also be
larger on average with higher SNAP benefits but also higher SPM thresholds.
Summary
This analysis illustrates that a more modern measure of poverty is required to assess the antipoverty effec-
tiveness of the safety net. The SPM includes the effects of all cash and noncash benefits, as well as refund-
able tax credits. It deducts necessary expenses (taxes, child care, and work expenses). Unlike the official
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Remaining in Poverty Lifted above Poverty
GA IL MA GA IL MA
Number of families 149,762 170,232 61,927 97,766 109,926 63,846
Percent of pre–safety net poor 60.5 60.8 49.2 39.5 39.2 50.8
Private income 8,961 9,766 11,561 15,803 17,055 14,386
Average amount received ($)
Social Security 1,113 922 1,252 3,832 3,951 3,767
Unemployment 237 321 470 496 1,019 847
Welfare 180 330 1,875 295 307 2,611
SSI 845 894 1,212 1,627 1,334 2,355
SNAP 3,940 4,289 2,720 2,630 2,655 2,399
Public/subsidized housing 1,344 1,718 2,107 1,473 1,894 4,203
EITC 1,770 1,873 1,685 3,026 2,945 2,163
Refundable child tax credit 326 361 504 851 939 598
State tax credits 62 94 253 39 147 324
Gross income ($) 18,777 20,566 23,639 30,071 32,247 33,652
– Taxes −719 −869 −975 −1,273 −1,493 −1,168
– Work expenses −1,195 −1,255 −1,326 −1,547 −1,605 −1,522
Net income ($) 16,864 18,442 21,337 27,251 29,148 30,962
TABLE 9. Safety Net Effects on Family Income for Families with Children, 2008
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
poverty measure, the SPM takes into account differences in the cost of housing across states. The SPM
shows that the safety net dramatically reduces poverty, especially among children. SPM geographic
adjustments also shift the poverty profile across states, reducing poverty rates for adults and children in
Georgia, causing a slight reduction in poverty rates in Illinois, and increasing poverty rates in Massachu-
setts, reflecting these states’ relatively low, moderate, and high housing costs.
An assessment of safety net policies using the SPM highlights some unique features of different pro-
grams. Federal programs with benefits that do not vary across states such as SNAP and the EITC have
a larger impact in states with lower housing costs and therefore lower poverty thresholds. States with rel-
atively generous safety net policies and higher-than-average housing costs can moderate some effects of
higher living costs on poverty.
Some specific findings:
n Poverty among children as measured by the SPM would at least double in all three states in the
absence of safety net benefits. Means-tested programs have much greater poverty-reduction power for
children and nonelderly adults than universal programs that do not target the poor.
n SNAP benefits alone reduce the SPM by 5.1 percentage points among children in Georgia, 4 points
in Illinois, and 3.4 points in Massachusetts. These effects reflect differences in program participation
rates but also the higher relative value of SNAP in lower-cost states such as Georgia and Illinois.
n Housing assistance is especially effective in reducing the number of families falling below the SPM
threshold in higher-cost states since its value varies with housing costs. However, housing assistance
is not an entitlement and is received by only 14 percent of the pre–safety net poor in Georgia, 18 per-
cent in Illinois, and 27 percent in Massachusetts.
n Refundable federal tax credits have the largest poverty-reduction effects especially among families with
children in Georgia and Illinois where the value of these credits goes the furthest toward increasing
family resources.
n Safety net policies alleviate poverty among the majority of families in deep poverty (pre–safety net
incomes below 50 percent of the SPM threshold). In all three states, at least 8 out of 10 children in
deep poverty based on their private income move out of deep poverty as a result of government safety
net policies.
n States’ safety net policies matter. Children living in deep poverty based on pre–safety net income are
twice as likely to move out of poverty in Massachusetts as in Georgia or Illinois. About 4 in 10 move
out of poverty in Massachusetts as a result of the safety net, compared with about 2 in 10 in Georgia
and Illinois.
The SPM allows the assessment of safety net policies across programs and states. The SPM shows that
three safety net policies not taken into account in the official poverty measure—the federal EITC, SNAP,
and housing assistance—have the largest effects on poverty reduction. The results demonstrate the
importance of adopting the measure for any assessment of poverty status and the effects of safety net
policies. It is critical to work toward making the measure available at the state level.
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The SPM thresholds used in this analysis are based on the 2008 SPM thresholds developed by Garner
(2011b) that include spending on medical out-of-pocket expenses. We adjust the housing portion of
the threshold for variation in housing expenses, by state and by Super-Public Use Microdata Area
(Super-PUMA) within state. The medical out-of-pocket portion of the threshold is adjusted for differ-
ences in family health insurance status, health status, and presence of an elderly member. Components
of the SPM threshold are explained in greater detail below.
The 2008 SPM threshold used for this analysis is based on out-of-pocket spending for food, clothing,
shelter, health care, and utilities (FCSUM), with a multiplier of 1.2 to provide for additional basic needs.
The threshold is calculated using five years of Consumer Expenditure Survey data and reflects FCSUM
spending at the 33rd percentile for families with two children. The threshold is adjusted for families of
different size and number of children using a three-parameter equivalence scale. The thresholds are also
adjusted to reflect differences in housing costs for renters, homeowners with mortgages, and homeown-
ers without mortgages. The resulting thresholds for a family of two adults and two children for 2008 are
$26,252 for renters, $26,660 for owners with mortgages, and $21,860 for owners without mortgages.
Prior estimates of the SPM thresholds (Garner 2010, 2011a) did not include an allowance for out-
of-pocket medical expenses (MOOP). Based on National Academy of Sciences (Citro and Michael
1995) and the Interagency Technical Working Group (ITWG) recommendations, the Census Bureau
SPM estimates subtract MOOP reported in the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement data from
resources when calculating the SPM. Since the ACS data used for our analysis do not include MOOP,
we requested a version of the SPM thresholds that includes an allowance for out-of-pocket medical
APPENDIX A.
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expenses from the BLS (Garner 2011b). We adjust the MOOP share of the threshold for differences in
insurance status (private, public, uninsured), elderly/nonelderly status, health status, and family size fol-
lowing the Census Bureau’s NAS estimate methodology (Short 2001).
We develop geographic adjustments following procedures developed at the Census Bureau. Develop-
ment at the Census Bureau is ongoing, and our approach most closely resembles the approach outlined
in Short and Renwick (2010).13 As in that paper, our geographic adjustments are calculated based on
three-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates of median gross rents for two-bedroom rental
units with complete kitchen and plumbing facilities.14 Since MSAs are not identified in the public-use
ACS, we could not follow the Census Bureau’s approach of adjusting the SPM by identifiable metro-
politan statistical area (MSA), nonmetropolitan area, and residual metropolitan area within each state.
Instead, we follow the Census Bureau methodology for calculating geographic adjustments, but calcu-
late the adjustments at the Super-PUMA level instead of the MSA level.15 We divide the median rents
calculated for each Super-PUMA by the national median to calculate an initial index. We normalize the
index so the mean of the resulting indices (when applied to all persons) is equal to one. We then multi-
ply the housing portion16 of the SPM threshold by the normalized index, and add in the nonhousing
portion and MOOP adjustment to calculate the final threshold.
Table A1 shows the geographic adjustments for each state, by Super-PUMA, and the resulting thresh-
old for a two-adult, two-child family that rents its home, has private insurance, and is in good health.
Thresholds for the example family range from $22,503 to $27,449 in Georgia, from $21,763 to $29,964
in Illinois, and from $25,200 to $34,575 in Massachusetts. State maps showing the boundaries of each
2000 Super-PUMA area can be accessed at the Census Bureau web site at http://www.census.gov/geo/
www/maps/sup_puma.htm.
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Georgia Illinois Massachusetts
Super- Geographic Example Super- Geographic Example Super- Geographic Example 
PUMA adjustment threshold PUMA adjustment threshold PUMA adjustment threshold
13010 0.68957 22,503 17010 0.69419 22,559 25010 0.95105 25,661
13020 0.75204 23,258 17020 0.63634 21,860 25020 1.35946 30,593
13030 0.92675 25,367 17030 0.62825 21,763 25030 1.20096 28,679
13040 0.89204 24,948 17040 0.81915 24,068 25040 1.27269 29,545
13050 1.07022 27,100 17050 0.75204 23,258 25050 1.66954 34,337
13060 1.08757 27,309 17060 0.79138 23,733 25060 1.08179 27,240
13070 1.03898 26,723 17070 0.80064 23,845 25070 0.94873 25,633
13080 1.09914 27,449 17080 0.83303 24,236 25080 1.4902 32,172
13090 0.94873 25,633 17090 1.10261 27,491 25090 1.43004 31,445
13100 0.7208 22,880 17100 1.02394 26,541 25100 1.68921 34,575
13110 0.77171 23,495 17201 1.23567 29,098 25110 1.29699 29,838
17202 1.20327 28,707 25120 1.38839 30,942
17300 1.13385 27,868 25130 0.91287 25,200
17401 1.21484 28,846
17402 1.22641 28,986
17403 1.02162 26,513
17404 1.01815 26,471
17405 1.03782 26,709
17501 1.3074 29,964
17502 1.04129 26,751
17503 1.06906 27,086
17504 0.94873 25,633
17505 0.95567 25,717
TABLE A1. Geographic Adjustments and Example Thresholds, by State and Super-PUMA
Note: Example threshold is for two-adult, two-child family that rents, has private insurance, and is in good health.

The analysis relies on a combination of logical edits to the American Community Survey (ACS) data
and simulation procedures to add the elements required for the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM)
family resource measure. Three types of work are required: augmenting the ACS data on demographic
characteristics, adding elements of resources that are not present in the ACS data, and making adjust-
ments to some elements of resources that are included but underreported in the ACS data (table B1).
Procedures
These procedures first require understanding the family relationships among members of ACS households.
The ACS includes each person’s relationship to the householder, but does not ask for inter-relationships
among other individuals. That information is needed for correct modeling of government benefit and tax
programs, each of which specify who must file for benefits or taxes together. For example, the filing unit
for TANF includes parents and their dependent children (but does not include other members of a house-
hold), and the filing unit for income taxes is an unmarried individual or a married couple together with
their dependents. Also, poverty measures define whose resources must be included in the “family.” The
modern measures include all family members related by blood, marriage, or adoption, foster children, and
cohabiting adults. We use the IPUMS version of the ACS, developed by researchers at the University of
Minnesota, for imputations of the relationships of individuals in ACS households (Ruggles et al. 2000).
Subsequently, each TRIM3 simulation module uses this information and individual program rules to
determine which individuals file for benefits together or pay taxes together.
APPENDIX B. 
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Methods
Data ACS IPUMS
Definition of poverty units
Detailed family relationship data
Foster children
Cohabitors
Unrelated subfamilies
College students/group quarters
Elements of resource definition not reported in ACS data
Taxes
SNAP
Public and subsidized housing
Work-related expenses
TABLE B1. TRIM3 Procedures to Calculate Family Resources for the SPM
ACS data plus IPUMS imputations show interrelationships of individuals
in households.
Included in the primary family.
Combines household reference person and his or her partner (and their
families) into the same poverty unit (ACS does not identify other
cohabiting couples). Weights unit using household reference per-
son’s weight.
Identified using IPUMS relationship imputations. (Data do not allow
identification of all unrelated subfamily relationships; e.g., two
brothers unrelated to householder.)
Excludes all group quarters.
1) Filing unit: Head of household status assigned only to unmarried
householder with qualifying dependents. Applies qualifying child
and dependent rules to first see if person can be claimed as depend-
ent of parent; if not, then of householder. Does not model sharing of
children for EITC or dependency.
2) Filing behavior: Assumes all units submit return.
3) Deductions: Mortgage interest set at 80% of mortgage payment;
property tax deduction taken as reported; state tax deduction 
based on greater of state income taxes (from preliminary state tax
simulation) and state sales tax deduction (from IRS look-up table);
average charitable contributions assigned based on IRS data (by
AGI level and state). State taxes recalculated based on final federal
tax simulation.
1) Unit: Splits households containing TANF or SSI recipients into maxi-
mum number of units. Households with unrelated subfamilies or
individuals are also split into maximum units (but partners file
together). All other households file as entire household.
2) Eligibility and benefits: Simulated using program rules monthly; ben-
efits for ineligible reporters set to 0. Additional eligibles added to eli-
gible reporters to reach control targets by subgroups.
1) Randomly assign to income-eligible renters that are eligible for a
positive subsidy to reach control totals by income level and other
demographic characteristics; reported rent used for clues. Valued at
FMR minus household’s required rental payment (maximum of 30%
of adjusted or 10% of gross income).
2) Housing subsidies capped at housing portion of threshold minus
household’s required rental payment.
1) Child care: TRIM3 identifies likely CCDF subsidy recipients and
assigns copay. SIPP-based equations impute likelihood and amount
of expenses for other families; aligned to targets from SIPP and
NSAF data.
2) Transportation: Use Census Bureau imputation methods based on
miles driven and cost per mile.
Another aspect of demographic data that is incompletely reported in the ACS is immigrant status. The
ACS indicates if an individual is a citizen, but (like most surveys) does not provide a person’s immigrant
status. Eligibility for government benefits varies by immigrant status and year of arrival. Following pro-
cedures developed by Jeffrey Passel and others, some noncitizens are identified as refugees/asylees.17
Other noncitizens are treated as legal permanent residents, although some of these are likely undocu-
mented aliens; thus, we may assign benefits to some noncitizens who would in reality be ineligible.
Information not reported on the ACS but required for the SPM includes tax liabilities, SNAP benefits
(receipt is reported), the value of residing in public and subsidized housing, and work-related expenses
(child care, transportation, and other work-related expenses). Tax simulations include payroll taxes and
federal and state income taxes, including tax credits. Child care expenses are modeled by first simulat-
ing subsidized child care, then imputing unsubsidized expenses to families who do not receive subsidies.
Work expenses other than child care are imputed following the standard Census Bureau procedure of a
flat dollar amount per week of work, with no variation across the states.
Other information included on the ACS is underreported compared with program administrative data.
It is important for the analysis of safety net programs to capture all benefits and spending, especially in
the largest programs in 2008. As shown, the TRIM3 model corrects for SSI, TANF, and unemployment
insurance (UI) benefit underreporting.
Unemployment insurance is important for poverty measurement but is not reported separately in the
ACS data. Instead, the ACS asks respondents to report all “other income”—including unemployment
benefits, child support, workers compensation, veterans benefits, and alimony. In order to use this infor-
mation, we first predict the share of other income likely to be UI and likely to be child support income
using regression techniques.18 Because these methods suggest that UI benefits are substantially under-
reported, additional benefits are simulated to come closer to actual data.
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Methods
Data ACS IPUMS
Cash resources corrected in the ACS data
Earnings, asset income, Social Security
SSI
TANF and other welfare
Unemployment insurance, child support,
other income
TABLE B1. TRIM3 Procedures to Calculate Family Resources for the SPM (Continued)
Generally uses ACS data, but some very high SSI amounts classified as
Social Security
SSI uses TRIM3 to simulate program rules. Additional eligibles selected
to meet program totals.
1) The ACS includes a variable called “welfare” that includes TANF and
general assistance. The model first selects some of this income as
TANF based on a logical edit that assigns the amount as TANF if
there are dependent children under age 19 and if the family is suffi-
ciently low income to be eligible for TANF.
2) TANF (including solely state-funded benefits) is simulated based on
each state’s program rules and is aligned so units and benefits
match program totals as closely as possible.
The ACS includes an income variable called “other” that includes UI,
child support, and “other.” UI income is predicted based on a multi-
nomial logit equation. UI income is augmented via simulation to
come closer to actual benefits.
Notes: Some in-kind benefits not included (WIC, LIHEAP, and school lunch). Also, child support paid not available.
Similarly, TANF is reported with other types of welfare in the state (such as General Assistance). We use a
logical edit to assign welfare as TANF if the family has dependent children and passes the eligibility tests in
its state; otherwise, the reported amount is considered “other welfare.” SSI is reported separately in the ACS
data, but many reported amounts appear to exceed the maximum possible annual SSI benefit, suggesting
confusion with Social Security. A logical edit reassigns some reported SSI amounts as Social Security.
After any initial assignments and logical edits, the same general procedures are used to simulate all the
government benefit programs—unemployment benefits, SSI, TANF, SNAP, housing assistance, and
child care subsidies. In each case, TRIM3 first estimates eligibility and potential benefits using detailed
national and state policies, then selects additional recipients from among the eligible individuals or fam-
ilies who did not already report the benefit. The selection of the caseload is made in such a way that the
simulated caseload comes acceptably close to the actual caseload in terms of overall size and key charac-
teristics. All simulations use the policies that were in effect in 2008.
A key feature of the simulations is their internal consistency. Each simulation’s results may be used by
subsequent simulations, creating a comprehensive and internally consistent picture of a family’s income,
benefits, and taxes. For example, SSI recipients are excluded from TANF assistance units; the adjusted
amounts of SSI, TANF, and unemployment benefits are used in computing cash income for purposes
of SNAP benefits and child care subsidies; and the rent amounts imputed by the housing simulation are used
to determine the SNAP program’s excess shelter deduction. All tax and benefit amounts are computed con-
sistent with program rules and a family’s detailed information; in other words, there are no “across the
board” percentage adjustments to families’ tax and benefit amounts in order to come closer to targets.
Results
Table B2 shows the results of these simulations for each focal state. The total units receiving benefits dur-
ing the year and aggregate annual benefits come as close to the program totals shown as was feasible. It
was sometimes difficult to align elements of programs because reported family characteristics prevented
a better match. That is, if there are not enough families that meet program eligibility thresholds, we do
not assign benefits to families that do not meet the program rules. For example, UI units fall short of
administrative totals in Georgia (250,000 compared with 311,000, or 80 percent) and UI benefits
received are lower than targets in all three states (78 percent, 74 percent, and 72 percent of program totals,
respectively, in Georgia, Illinois, and Massachusetts). This means that our results underestimate the effect
of this benefit on income. SSI recipients and benefits come close to program totals in all three states. Sim-
ilarly, the average monthly simulated caseload for TANF matches program targets, and benefits come close
to the program targets. Average annual benefits in SNAP only reach about 89 percent of target in all three
states, although the simulated and actual caseload size correspond closely. Housing assistance units meet
the targets in all three states. We do not have targets for the value of the housing subsidy by state.
The tax simulations compute taxes based on the federal and state rules and each tax unit’s income and
characteristics. While there is no alignment, the results show close comparison with program totals on
total taxes paid. For example, federal income taxes (for positive returns) come within 10 to 14 percent
of program totals. The model does not produce enough tax units receiving the EITC (about 72 percent
in Georgia, 83 percent in Illinois, and 87 percent in Massachusetts). This is a problem often faced by
tax models that rely on survey data. Even assuming 100 percent participation, not enough tax filers
appear eligible for the credit. This is a complex credit with significant misfiling that is not captured in
the simulation model.
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C1. SPM Poverty Rate in Absence of Different Safety Net Programs, 2008
C2. Safety Net Effects on Family Income, 2008
C3. SPM Poverty Gap, Total, and in Absence of Different Safety Net Programs, 2008
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Adultsa Children
GA IL MA GA IL MA
SPM poverty rate 12.5 10.7 9.6 13.8 12.4 9.0
Rates without safety net benefitsb
All public benefits 20.6 17.8 16.2 28.7 24.6 21.0
Social Security 15.7 13.4 12.1 15.7 14.1 10.6
Unemployment compensation 13.0 11.3 10.2 14.4 13.2 10.0
All means-tested benefits (all below) 17.3 14.9 13.7 26.7 22.8 19.4
All welfare 12.6 10.8 10.4 14.1 12.7 11.6
TANF 12.6 10.7 10.1 14.0 12.6 10.9
Other public assistance 12.5 10.7 9.6 13.8 12.4 9.0
SSI 13.3 11.5 10.9 15.1 13.4 10.9
SNAP 14.1 12.0 10.9 18.9 16.4 12.4
Public/subsidized housing 13.1 11.4 11.4 15.6 14.6 13.4
Federal tax credits 15.4 13.1 10.8 22.8 19.3 13.3
EITC 14.6 12.4 10.5 20.1 17.0 11.6
Refundable child tax credit 13.3 11.2 9.9 16.6 14.4 10.1
State tax credits 12.5 10.7 9.6 13.9 12.6 9.2
TABLE C1. SPM Poverty Rate in Absence of Different Safety Net Programs, 2008
Remaining in Poverty Lifted above Poverty
GA IL MA GA IL MA
Number of families 445,394 501,266 247,544 157,777 188,097 122,575
Percent of pre–safety net poor 73.8 72.7 66.9 26.2 27.3 33.1
Private income $6,005 $6,358 $6,717 $11,905 $12,299 $9,582
Average amount received
Social Security $965 $757 $992 $6,880 $7,471 $6,288
Unemployment $196 $234 $301 $509 $807 $809
Welfare $86 $153 $544 $240 $302 $1,499
SSI $807 $861 $986 $1,397 $1,230 $2,451
SNAP $1,687 $1,982 $1,093 $1,727 $1,672 $1,554
Public/subsidized housing $642 $933 $921 $1,029 $1,286 $2,917
EITC $677 $708 $492 $1,914 $1,780 $1,151
Refundable child tax credit $110 $122 $126 $527 $549 $311
State tax credits $38 $35 $74 $37 $89 $173
Gross income $11,211 $12,143 $12,245 $26,164 $27,485 $26,735
– Taxes −$507 −$583 −$602 −$948 −$1,052 −$767
– Work expenses −$791 −$803 −$774 −$1,090 −$1,095 −$904
Net income $9,914 $10,757 $10,869 $24,126 $25,337 $25,064
TABLE C2. Safety Net Effects on Family Income, 2008 (SPM Units Containing Children or Nonelderly Heads)
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
a. Adults in units with children or nonelderly heads.
b. These estimates show poverty rates for adults and children when each safety benefit is removed from income.
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
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Nonelderly-Headed Families 
Families with Related Childrena without Related Children
GA IL MA GA IL MA
Number of families (thousands) 1,288 1,641 792 1,892 2,448 1,378
Number of poor families (thousands) 161 184 69 347 385 212
Poverty gap 913 1,072 412 1,892 2,213 1,486
Poverty gap in absence of the following income or benefit source:
All public benefits (all below) 3,534 4,285 2,151 3,302 4,028 2,764
Social Security 1,276 1,440 610 2,563 2,967 1,991
Unemployment compensation 965 1,171 465 1,969 2,308 1,564
All means-tested benefits (all below) 2,993 3,634 1,801 2,512 3,124 2,136
All welfare (three items below) 946 1,140 616 1,905 2,243 1,512
TANF 938 1,108 547 1,892 2,213 1,490
SSF 913 1,084 412 1,892 2,213 1,486
Other public assistance 921 1,091 466 1,904 2,243 1,508
SSI 1,110 1,296 569 2,166 2,553 1,768
SNAP 1,608 1,916 630 2,062 2,488 1,600
Public/subsidized housing 1,187 1,479 682 1,992 2,412 1,637
Federal EITC and refundable child tax credit 1,480 1,699 615 1,935 2,256 1,505
(combined effect of following two items)
Federal EITC 1,321 1,524 551 1,935 2,256 1,505
Federal refundable child tax credit 994 1,166 456 1,892 2,213 1,486
State EITC/Georgia Low Income Credit 922 1,089 429 1,900 2,215 1,489
Reduction in poverty gap from following income or benefit source:b
All public benefits (all below) 2,622 3,213 1,739 1,410 1,815 1,278
Social Security 364 368 198 671 754 504
Unemployment compensation 52 99 53 77 95 78
All means-tested benefits (all below) 2,081 2,562 1,389 620 911 650
All welfare (three items below) 33 68 205 13 30 26
TANF 25 36 135 1 0 4
SSF 0 12 0 0 0 0
Other public assistance 8 19 54 13 30 22
SSI 198 223 157 274 340 281
SNAP 695 844 218 170 275 114
Public/subsidized housing 275 407 270 100 199 151
Federal EITC and refundable child tax credit 568 626 203 43 43 18
(combined effect of following two items)
Federal EITC 409 452 139 43 43 18
Federal refundable child tax credit 82 93 44 0 0 0
State EITC/Georgia Low Income Credit 10 17 17 8 2 3
TABLE C3. SPM Poverty Gap, Total, and in Absence of Different Safety Net Programs, 2008 
($ million unless otherwise specified)
(continued)
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Nonelderly-Headed Families 
Families with Related Childrena without Related Children
GA IL MA GA IL MA
Percent reduction in poverty gap from following income or benefit source:c
All public benefits (all below) 74.2 75.0 80.8 42.7 45.1 46.2
Social Security 28.5 25.6 32.4 26.2 25.4 25.3
Unemployment compensation 5.4 8.4 11.3 3.9 4.1 5.0
All means-tested benefits (all below) 69.5 70.5 77.1 24.7 29.2 30.4
All welfare (three items below) 3.5 5.9 33.2 0.7 1.3 1.7
TANF 2.7 3.3 24.7 0.0 0.0 0.3
SSF 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other public assistance 0.9 1.8 11.5 0.7 1.3 1.4
SSI 17.8 17.2 27.6 12.7 13.3 15.9
SNAP 43.2 44.1 34.6 8.2 11.1 7.1
Public/subsidized housing 23.1 27.5 39.6 5.0 8.3 9.2
Federal EITC and refundable child tax credit 38.4 36.9 33.0 2.2 1.9 1.2
(combined effect of following two items)
Federal EITC 30.9 29.7 25.3 2.2 1.9 1.2
Federal refundable child tax credit 8.2 8.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
State EITC/Georgia Low Income Credit 1.0 1.6 4.0 0.4 0.1 0.2
TABLE C3. SPM Poverty Gap, Total, and in Absence of Different Safety Net Programs, 2008  (Continued)
($ million unless otherwise specified)
Source: TRIM3 using 2008 American Community Survey.
a. Families with related children include families with elderly heads that also have related children.
b. The poverty gap in the absence of the income or benefit source, minus the actual poverty gap.
c. The reduction in the poverty gap by the income or benefit source, divided by the poverty gap in the absence of the income or benefit source.
1. The ITWG report can be found at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/SPM_TWGObservations.pdf.
2. The means-tested programs included in the analysis account for the largest federal programs outside health and educa-
tion programs for people with low incomes (Spar 2011).
3. The federal government finances most of the extended benefit program. All but one state take the option to pay EUC
before EB, and EB has been funded completely by the federal government from February 2009 through December 1,
2010. See Vroman (2010).
4. “Comparison of State Unemployment Laws 2008,” http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2008/
comparison2008.asp.
5. See discussion of Federal Housing Assistance in U.S. Ways and Means Committee (2009).
6. The refundable portion of the child tax credit equals the amount of the child tax credit exceeding tax liability, capped at
15 percent of earnings exceeding $8,500 in 2008. Families with more than two children have the choice of an alternative
cap equal to the amount of the families’ Social Security plus Medicare payroll tax minus their refundable EITC.
7. The essential elements of the SPM were originally developed by a National Academy of Sciences Panel and published in
1995 (Citro and Michael 1995). Subsequently, the Census Bureau conducted and published numerous refinements of the
measure. In 2010, the Interagency Technical Working Group provided recommendations for the development of the SPM,
drawing from the NAS report and incorporating lessons from subsequent research (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
8. The SPM thresholds were provided by Thesia Garner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and include out-of-pocket med-
ical expenses. The thresholds vary depending on family size and number of children. As explained in appendix A, we adjust
the housing portion of the threshold for differences in housing costs by Super-PUMA within the state and the medical
portion for differences in the health and insurance status of a family, and elderly/nonelderly status. Given so many dif-
ferent dimensions, we show the average threshold applied in each state for families with two adults and two children.
9. We also include elderly people who live in units headed by a nonelderly person.
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10. These results show the effect of eliminating either all benefits or a single benefit from income and then recomputing 
the SPM.
11. Our TANF estimates for Illinois include families receiving solely state-funded (SSF) benefits.
12. The results discussed here are for families with children. Overall results for families with children or a nonelderly head are
displayed in appendix table C2.
13. Trudi Renwick advised us in our efforts to replicate the Census Bureau methodology.
14. Our work predated the Census Bureau’s more recent work that uses five years of ACS data and calculates different geo-
graphic adjustments by whether the household rents, owns with a mortgage, or owns without a mortgage (Renwick 2011),
so these enhancements are not captured.
15. The Super-PUMA is a geographic area composed of a population of 400,000 or more. It does not span state lines. Super-
PUMAs are composed of PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas) that reflect population groups of at least 100,000. We did
not calculate our adjustments at the PUMA level out of concern that it represents too small a geographic area.
16. The housing portion of the SPM threshold equals 46.0 percent for renters, 46.8 percent for homeowners with mortgages,
and 35.2 percent for homeowners without mortgages (Garner 2011b).
17. See Passel, Van Hook, and Bean (2006).
18. We used the Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate this regression. Since all the elements of the ACS “other income”
are reported separately on the CPS, we could create a combined “other income” variable to match the one represented in
the ACS. The multinomial logit regression was estimated to predict the share of income attributable to UI, to child sup-
port, and to other income. See Martinez-Schiferl (2011) for a detailed description of these procedures.
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